If You Copied an Address on ledger.com on November 16: What Happened and What to Check
On November 16, ledger.com and 177 other sites unknowingly served code that swapped crypto addresses for the attacker's. It did not come through Ledger but through Optimizely, a third-party tool. Losses were small, but if you copied or pasted an address on one of those sites that day, check where your payment went.
What happened
Optimizely's timeline for November 16, in Madrid time (UTC+1) [1]:
- 08:51. First malicious code written to a customer project.
- 14:34. Optimizely detects the activity.
- 17:10. The flaw is closed.
- 23:24. The code is removed from all affected projects.
The start time comes with a caveat. Report URI, Scott Helme's firm that exposed the attack, saw the first injection in the BBC's snippet at 05:21 [2], and Hecavex dates the first change to that project at 04:55 [3]. Optimizely has not explained the difference.
Report URI found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it checked, belonging to 178 organisations [2][4]. They include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC and Ledger, on ledger.com and www.ledger.com [2]. By its timeline, ledger.com was clean at 21:41 [2].
What the code did
According to Report URI and 0xCERT, it was a multi-purpose kit [2][4]:
- It swapped addresses. It looked for valid Bitcoin, Ethereum and EVM, Tron, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin addresses and replaced them with the attacker's [2]. It worked on page text, form inputs and the clipboard, so an address copied from an affected page could already be swapped by the time it was pasted into a wallet [4].
- It skimmed cards. It captured card number, expiry and CVV from forms on the page itself [4]. Optimizely notes that hosted payment iframes such as Stripe or Adyen were out of its reach [1].
- It took cookies and screenshots whenever it swapped an address [4].
- It went after unpatched iPhones. On iPhones and iPads it loaded the Coruna and DarkSword kits, according to Report URI [2]. Optimizely describes a second-stage script aimed at iOS 18.6 and lower [1].
What Ledger says
Ledger replied on X on November 18 at 12:32 Madrid time [5]. It says the incident affects Optimizely, a third-party service used on ledger.com alongside numerous other websites, that its team has remediated the issue and that the malicious code is no longer served through its website [5]. It adds that the incident does not affect the security architecture of Ledger devices, and that private keys remain protected by the device [5]. It also reminds users that it never asks for the 24-word phrase, and to Clear Sign transactions where possible [5].
How much was stolen
Not much, and the figures do not agree.
- Report URI counted about $7,040 received by the attacker's wallets as of 20:25 Madrid time on November 16 [2].
- Hecavex and Bitquery, working separately, put the payments that look like they came from victims at about $2,260 across 19 payments [3][4]. The gap is mostly in Bitcoin: according to Hecavex, 0.07607213 BTC of what arrived was the attacker's own stablecoins coming back from a swap service, not stolen money [3].
The Bitcoin trail, traced with our node
We checked the attacker's Bitcoin address, 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW, with our own node [6]. Here is what it shows:
- Five incoming transactions on November 16, for 0.08528782 BTC in total. That matches Hecavex's figure [3].
- One of them, at 14:18 Madrid time, pays the address three times in the same transaction, 0.07607213 BTC in all. That is the structure Hecavex describes as the attacker's stablecoin swap [3]. The chain shows the three payments; where the money came from is Hecavex's finding, not ours.
- The other four, at 12:13, 17:25, 19:53 and 20:57, add up to 0.00921569 BTC. These are the ones Hecavex treats as victim payments, about $596 [3].
- The sweep. At 06:39 Madrid time on November 17, a single transaction gathered all seven outputs and sent 0.08524462 BTC to
bc1q5flj…fv0u99[6], the same address Report URI and Hecavex flag [2][3]. - It is still there. That address had received and been emptied four times before, since February, each time the next day according to Hecavex, which reads it as a deposit address at a custodial service [3]. Not this time: at our last check (block 976,455, November 18 at 16:54 Madrid time) the 0.08524462 BTC had not moved [6].
"Custodial service" is Hecavex's reading of the pattern, not an identification. If it holds, someone knows whose account it is, and a legal request could reach them [3].
What to check if you used ledger.com or another affected site that day
- Review your November 16 payments. Search your wallet or exchange history for the attacker's addresses. On Bitcoin,
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW. The addresses for the other networks are in the 0xCERT advisory [4]. - If you sent nothing, the address swap cost you nothing. That part of the code acted on addresses you copied, pasted or sent from those sites, and Ledger says its devices and keys are unaffected [5]. The exception is unpatched iPhones, in point 6.
- Always check the address on your hardware wallet's screen. This is the rule the attack cannot get around: the code changes what the browser shows, not what the device shows. Compare at least the beginning and the end with the address the recipient gave you, ideally through a different channel.
- If you sent funds to the attacker, the transaction cannot be reversed. Keep the transaction ID, file a police report and tell the exchange you sent from. And be wary of anyone who writes offering to recover the funds: that scam always follows.
- If you typed a card into a form on an affected site that day, talk to your bank. Optimizely rates that case as high risk [1].
- If you browsed on an older iPhone or iPad, update it. Report URI says iOS 18.7.3 or later, or 26.3 or later [2]. We explain why in our piece on DarkSword and the iOS versions at risk.
It is not Ledger's first scare this autumn, but it is a different kind from the implants we cover in our report on implanted Ledgers at official retailers. This time the problem was not the device but a third-party piece of its website. And the defence is the usual one: what counts is what the device screen says.
Sources
Labelled by type. Times are Madrid time (UTC+1) unless marked UTC.
- Optimizely, Security Incident Initial Report for Customers – Optimizely Web Experimentation, November 17, 2026. Attack vector, UTC timeline, what the code collected and risk by site type. (Primary, official report)
- Report URI (Scott Helme), World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely, November 16, 2026, updated November 17. 178 organisations, timeline, payload functions, wallets and sweeps. (Primary, technical analysis)
- Hecavex, OPTIMJACK: Inside track.js, 26 Builds and the Money Trail of the Optimizely Attack, November 17, 2026. Victim payments, the attacker's stablecoin swap and the sweep's deposit address. (Primary, technical analysis)
- 0xCERT, Optimizely Web supply-chain attack served crypto address swapper and card skimmer on 178 sites incl. Ledger (0xCERT-2026-0365), November 16, 2026, updated November 17. Affected networks, Report URI and Bitquery figures, attacker addresses, recommendations. (Secondary, security advisory)
- Ledger (@Ledger), reply on the Optimizely incident, November 18, 2026, 12:32. (Primary, official X account)
- Our node: address
19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW, sweep transaction178a4af4…edf0cb6and addressbc1q5flj…fv0u99, checked on November 18, 2026 up to block 976,455. (Primary, own data)
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Last updated: November 18, 2026